I recently attended a Safeguards Education Roundtable at the Argonne National Laboratory sponsored by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI).  University professors and nonproliferation experts from U.S. national laboratories met at this event to discuss safeguards education at universities. The goal of NGSI is to "to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system" as it evolves in the future. A major pillar of the program is developing the next generation of professionals to work in the nonproliferation and safeguards field-and to make sure that the next generation of nuclear professionals is aware of nonproliferation and safeguards issues.

Expanding U.S. nuclear exports a key component of effective nonproliferation policy

The American Nuclear Society's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Technical Group (NNTG) will host a distinguished two-part panel session on the Middle East as part of its embedded topical at the 2013 ANS Winter Meeting and Nuclear Technology Expo in our nation's capitol.

Nuclear Nonproliferation, International Safeguards, and Nuclear Security Challenges in the Middle East

On September 11, the National Nuclear Security Administration (U.S. Department of Energy) hosted a public meeting in Chattanooga, Tenn., concerning its Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement on the disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for use in power reactors. You may have seen the ANS Call to Action for the hearing and perhaps read the ANS position statement or background information.

The draft SEIS meeting for disposition of surplus weapons plutonium in MOX fuel started out relatively smoothly-lots (and I mean lots) of pro-nuclear folks in the room; my initial estimates would put the pro-nuclear folks from the University of Tennessee and Chattannooga State University at over half the crowd present. No zombie sightings as of yet.

Hi folks, Steve Skutnik here-you may know me from The Neutron Economy blog. I'm also currently an assistant professor of nuclear engineering at the University of Tennessee. I'll be here with Suzy Hobbs-Baker (of PopAtomic Studios) and Laura Scheele live-blogging the public hearing on the use of surplus weapons plutonium in MOX fuel. I've also got a healthy contingent of eager students from the University of Tennessee here as well, eager to speak up for the nonproliferation benefits of disposing of surplus plutonium in MOX fuel.

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The U.S. doesn't want to hear about it

On Thursday, June 28, the American Nuclear Society's Board of Directors formally adopted a position statement entitled U.S. Global Nuclear Leadership through Export-Driven Engagement. ANS position statements reflect the Society's perspectives on issues of public interest that involve various aspects of nuclear science and technology. The text of the June 2012 position statement is below, and the full list of ANS positions statements can be accessed via the ANS website by clicking HERE.

On  Wednesday, June 6, Dr. Mark T. Peters appeared on behalf  of the American Nuclear Society before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.  Peters is the Deputy Laboratory Director for Programs at Argonne National Laboratory and testified at the invitation of the subcommittee.

In 2009, the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed a "123" agreement, which allowed the transfer of US nuclear technology (e.g., reactors, etc.) to the UAE. As a condition of the agreement, the UAE gave up all rights to enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel, now and at any point in the future. Thus, the UAE agreed to give up significant rights that are granted to it as a signee of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The reasons for using plutonium in space missions are often unclear to those outside the mission planning community. Observers may see or hear only that the space mission is nuclear related, and that the power source uses plutonium.

An advanced reactor could be used to consume 112 tonnes of weapons grade material