An issue regarding the incorporation of software reliability within the nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk assessment model has emerged in the licensing processes of digitalized NPPs. Since software failure induces common-cause failure of the processor modules, the reliability of the software used in the NPP safety-critical instrumentation and control systems must be quantified and verified with proper test cases and environments.

In this study, a software testing method based on the minimal cut set (MCS)–based exhaustive test case generation scheme is proposed where the software logic model is developed from available information on the software development and the MCSs that represent the necessary and sufficient conditions for the software variables’ states to produce safety software outputs are generated. The MCSs are then converted into the test cases, which can be used as inputs to the test bed to verify that the test cases produce correct outputs after software execution. The effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated with the safety-critical trip logic software of the APR-1400 reactor protection system. The method provides a systematic way to conduct exhaustive software testing and prove the functionality of the nuclear safety software based on the test result without uncertainties.