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The mission of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Division (NNPD) is to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology while simultaneously preventing the diversion and misuse of nuclear material and technology through appropriate safeguards and security, and promotion of nuclear nonproliferation policies. To achieve this mission, the objectives of the NNPD are to: Promote policy that discourages the proliferation of nuclear technology and material to inappropriate entities. Provide information to ANS members, the technical community at large, opinion leaders, and decision makers to improve their understanding of nuclear nonproliferation issues. Become a recognized technical resource on nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security issues. Serve as the integration and coordination body for nuclear nonproliferation activities for the ANS. Work cooperatively with other ANS divisions to achieve these objective nonproliferation policies.
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The busyness of the nuclear fuel supply chain
Ken Petersenpresident@ans.org
With all that is happening in the industry these days, the nuclear fuel supply chain is still a hot topic. The Russian assault in Ukraine continues to upend the “where” and “how” of attaining nuclear fuel—and it has also motivated U.S. legislators to act.
Two years into the Russian war with Ukraine, things are different. The Inflation Reduction Act was passed in 2022, authorizing $700 million in funding to support production of high-assay low-enriched uranium in the United States. Meanwhile, the Department of Energy this January issued a $500 million request for proposals to stimulate new HALEU production. The Emergency National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2024 includes $2.7 billion in funding for new uranium enrichment production. This funding was diverted from the Civil Nuclear Credits program and will only be released if there is a ban on importing Russian uranium into the United States—which could happen by the time this column is published, as legislation that bans Russian uranium has passed the House as of this writing and is headed for the Senate. Also being considered is legislation that would sanction Russian uranium. Alternatively, the Biden-Harris administration may choose to ban Russian uranium without legislation in order to obtain access to the $2.7 billion in funding.
Jorge H. Barón, Jorge E. Núñez McLeod, Selva S. Rivera
Nuclear Technology | Volume 134 | Number 2 | May 2001 | Pages 97-109
Technical Paper | Reactor Safety | doi.org/10.13182/NT01-A3189
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
Construction of the CAREM-25 full-size prototype, a very low power nuclear power station [25 MW(electric)], is scheduled to begin in Argentina in 2001. The CAREM-25 is designed based on principles of inherent safety, passive safety functions, and ease of operation. This paper analyzes the safety philosophy from the point of view of risk by performing a level-III probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of this prototype. The specific PSA steps are discussed, including a specially developed method to obtain representative initiating events, system analysis by fault trees, event development in event trees, plant and containment response analysis, containment event tree development, consequence calculations, and risk representation. The PSA results are presented and discussed in terms of their own values as well as in comparison to other PSA results performed for larger nuclear power plants (NPPs). The advantages of the CAREM-25 from the risk point of view are studied in terms of the effective reduction of both the probability of severe accident sequences and the potential consequences of such sequences (radiological and emergency preparedness impact). The risk point of view also provides a perspective to analyze the impact of several design modifications in order to further reduce the residual risk of the NPP. These design modifications, several of which have already been included in the prototype, are discussed and evaluated.