Nuclear Technology / Volume 179 / Number 1 / July 2012 / Pages 91-96
Technical Paper / Special Issue on Safeguards / Fuel Cycle and Management
The Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Working Group of the Generation IV International Forum conducted a high-level pathway analysis of a hypothetical sodium fast reactor and integral fuel processing facility (called collectively the Example Sodium Fast Reactor, or ESFR), as a test of the effectiveness of its analysis methodology. This paper presents the results of the analysis based on the breakout scenario. Four representative strategies were chosen for analysis: diversion of low-enriched uranium feed material, two different types of misuse of the reactor facility, and misuse of the fuel processing facility. A high-level pathways analysis was conducted for each strategy to determine relative ranking of the proliferation-time measure, specifically as it applies to the postbreakout period.