Nuclear power plants are gradually digitizing their control rooms. This transition has been slow to come in the United States due to the reliability of existing equipment relative to the age of the plants; the stockpiled availability of analog spare parts; and the conservative, change-aversive nature of the nuclear industry. Meanwhile, plants saw the birth of human reliability analysis (HRA), which was largely developed to meet safety and regulatory requirements specifically in the nuclear industry. HRA reflected the as-built analog control nature of the plants, with little call to catalog and quantify emerging digital technologies that were not yet deployed. Other safety critical industries have been slower to embrace HRA, and a stumbling block remains their inability to generalize the methods to address the now ubiquitous digital control systems in these industries. New plant builds and control room modernization now present the need to ensure that HRA adequately covers digital control technologies being deployed in nuclear power plants. Digital systems present different human error opportunities, and the methods have not been adapted to this change. In this paper, we review considerations in operator performance that accompany the transition from analog to digital controls. These considerations drive new directions in HRA that will address both nuclear and non-nuclear digital controls. Finally, the technology shift from analog to digital control room creates new vulnerability for cyber threats.