There exist elements apart from uranium and plutonium that could potentially be used to construct the core of a nuclear explosive device. These belong to the so-called minor actinides (MAs), which exist in nonnegligible amounts in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and are in nearly all cases not covered by international safeguards. Future reprocessing of SNF could result in significant separation of these elements, potentially leading to new proliferation concerns. In this work, a methodology for a transparent assessment of the barriers against proliferation of MAs has been developed and applied to the case of neptunium, americium, and curium separated from spent fuel from pressurized water reactors. In this methodology, openly available data and Monte Carlo simulations have been used to assess the barriers posed by a number of parameters relevant to the production of a nuclear explosive device from SNF. The evaluation shows that the properties of neptunium present low barriers to proliferation and that it should be discussed within the context of future nonproliferation treaties and possibly be placed under international safeguards. The properties of americium and curium present higher barriers to proliferation, meaning that these elements require less focus in the nonproliferation context.