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HPS's Eric Goldin: On health physics
Eric Goldin, president of the Health Physics Society, is a radiation safety specialist with 40 years of experience in power reactor health physics, supporting worker and public radiation safety programs. A certified health physicist since 1984, he has served on the American Board of Health Physics, and since 2004, he has been a member of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements’ Program Area Committee 2, which provides guidance for radiation safety in occupational settings for a variety of industries and activities. He was awarded HPS Fellow status in 2012 and was elected to the NCRP in 2014.
Goldin’s radiological engineering experience includes ALARA programs, instrumentation, radioactive waste management, emergency planning, dosimetry, decommissioning, licensing, effluents, and environmental monitoring.
The HPS, headquartered in Herndon, Va., is the largest radiation safety society in the world. Its membership includes scientists, safety professionals, physicists, engineers, attorneys, and other professionals from academia, industry, medical institutions, state and federal government, the national laboratories, the military, and other organizations.
The HPS’s activities include encouraging research in radiation science, developing standards, and disseminating radiation safety information. Its members are involved in understanding, evaluating, and controlling the potential risks from radiation relative to the benefits.
Goldin talked about the HPS and health physics activities with Rick Michal, editor-in-chief of Nuclear News.
Roberto Ponciroli, Stefano Passerini, Richard B. Vilim
Nuclear Technology | Volume 199 | Number 1 | July 2017 | Pages 16-34
Technical Paper | dx.doi.org/10.1080/00295450.2017.1326783
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
Advanced reactors are often claimed to be passively safe against unprotected upset events. In common practice, these events are not considered in the context of the plant control system, i.e., the reactor is subjected to classes of unprotected upset events while the normally programmed response of the control system is assumed not to be present. However, this approach constitutes an oversimplification since, depending on the upset involving the control system, an actuator does not necessarily go in the same direction as needed for safety. In this work, dynamic simulations are performed to assess the degree to which the inherent self-regulating plant response is safe from active control system override. The simulations are meant to characterize the resilience of the plant to unprotected initiators. The initiators were represented and modeled as an actuator going to a hard limit. Consideration of failure is further limited to individual controllers as there is no cross-connect of signals between these controllers. The potential for passive safety override by the control system is then relegated to the single-input single-output controllers. The results show that when the plant control system is designed by taking into account and quantifying the impact of the plant control system on accidental scenarios there is very limited opportunity for the preprogrammed response of the control system to override passive safety protection in the event of an unprotected initiator.