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The human factor in licensing and operating the next generation of nuclear plants
As human factors specialists working at the intersection of human performance and nuclear operations, we are witnessing one of the nuclear sector’s most significant transitions in decades. The emergence of small modular reactors, microreactors, and other advanced designs is reshaping the industry’s landscape. Digital instrumentation and controls, passive safety systems, and increased automation are creating opportunities for greater safety margins and more flexible operation. These same features also fundamentally redefine what it means to “operate” a nuclear plant. Interactions among human roles, automation, and passive systems shape how people maintain awareness, exercise judgment, and intervene when necessary. These developments affect both operational realities and the regulatory foundations on which nuclear safety is built.
Yasunori Yamanaka, Shinya Mizokami, Manabu Watanabe, Takeshi Honda
Nuclear Technology | Volume 186 | Number 2 | May 2014 | Pages 263-279
Technical Paper | Reactor Safety | doi.org/10.13182/NT13-46
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
Because of the Great East Japan Earthquake, and the resulting tsunami, which occurred on March 11, 2011, a serious accident occurred in Units 1, 2, and 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. Since the accidents, data from interviews with operators and on-site surveys have been continuously compiled. Based on the data, a plant-state analysis has been conducted using the severe accident analysis code MAAP (Modular Accident Analysis Program). Parallel to the MAAP analysis, the responses of the plant to site operations, such as water injection, are analyzed, and core conditions are comprehensively evaluated. According to the evaluation, in Unit 1, it is presumed that almost no fuel was left at the original position; it was molten and moved downward. The fuel likely damaged the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), and it is assumed that most of it had dropped to the primary containment vessel (PCV) pedestal. In Units 2 and 3, it is presumed that some of the fuel was left at the original position and the rest dropped to the bottom of the RPV or to the PCV pedestal. In the MAAP analysis, the behavior of the plants before core melt is reproduced. However, RPV damage of Units 2 and 3 does not occur in the MAAP analysis, which is contrary to the observed facts. This shows that the analysis capability of the current MAAP code is limited. Therefore, by developing severe accident analysis codes to achieve higher levels of accuracy and by evaluating the plant responses to site operation, we will continue to obtain a clear picture of the states inside the reactor so that fuel debris can be removed.