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Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
The mission of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Division (NNPD) is to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology while simultaneously preventing the diversion and misuse of nuclear material and technology through appropriate safeguards and security, and promotion of nuclear nonproliferation policies. To achieve this mission, the objectives of the NNPD are to: Promote policy that discourages the proliferation of nuclear technology and material to inappropriate entities. Provide information to ANS members, the technical community at large, opinion leaders, and decision makers to improve their understanding of nuclear nonproliferation issues. Become a recognized technical resource on nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security issues. Serve as the integration and coordination body for nuclear nonproliferation activities for the ANS. Work cooperatively with other ANS divisions to achieve these objective nonproliferation policies.
Meeting Spotlight
2024 ANS Annual Conference
June 16–19, 2024
Las Vegas, NV|Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino
Standards Program
The Standards Committee is responsible for the development and maintenance of voluntary consensus standards that address the design, analysis, and operation of components, systems, and facilities related to the application of nuclear science and technology. Find out What’s New, check out the Standards Store, or Get Involved today!
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Can hydrogen be the transportation fuel in an otherwise nuclear economy?
Let’s face it: The global economy should be powered primarily by nuclear power. And it probably will by the end of this century, with a still-significant assist from renewables and hydro. Once nuclear systems are dominant, the costs come down to where gas is now; and when carbon emissions are reduced to a small portion of their present state, it will become obvious that most other sources are only good in niche settings. I mean, why use small modular reactors to load-follow when they can just produce that power instead of buffering it?
Yasunori Yamanaka, Shinya Mizokami, Manabu Watanabe, Takeshi Honda
Nuclear Technology | Volume 186 | Number 2 | May 2014 | Pages 263-279
Technical Paper | Reactor Safety | doi.org/10.13182/NT13-46
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
Because of the Great East Japan Earthquake, and the resulting tsunami, which occurred on March 11, 2011, a serious accident occurred in Units 1, 2, and 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. Since the accidents, data from interviews with operators and on-site surveys have been continuously compiled. Based on the data, a plant-state analysis has been conducted using the severe accident analysis code MAAP (Modular Accident Analysis Program). Parallel to the MAAP analysis, the responses of the plant to site operations, such as water injection, are analyzed, and core conditions are comprehensively evaluated. According to the evaluation, in Unit 1, it is presumed that almost no fuel was left at the original position; it was molten and moved downward. The fuel likely damaged the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), and it is assumed that most of it had dropped to the primary containment vessel (PCV) pedestal. In Units 2 and 3, it is presumed that some of the fuel was left at the original position and the rest dropped to the bottom of the RPV or to the PCV pedestal. In the MAAP analysis, the behavior of the plants before core melt is reproduced. However, RPV damage of Units 2 and 3 does not occur in the MAAP analysis, which is contrary to the observed facts. This shows that the analysis capability of the current MAAP code is limited. Therefore, by developing severe accident analysis codes to achieve higher levels of accuracy and by evaluating the plant responses to site operation, we will continue to obtain a clear picture of the states inside the reactor so that fuel debris can be removed.