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Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
The mission of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Division (NNPD) is to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology while simultaneously preventing the diversion and misuse of nuclear material and technology through appropriate safeguards and security, and promotion of nuclear nonproliferation policies. To achieve this mission, the objectives of the NNPD are to: Promote policy that discourages the proliferation of nuclear technology and material to inappropriate entities. Provide information to ANS members, the technical community at large, opinion leaders, and decision makers to improve their understanding of nuclear nonproliferation issues. Become a recognized technical resource on nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security issues. Serve as the integration and coordination body for nuclear nonproliferation activities for the ANS. Work cooperatively with other ANS divisions to achieve these objective nonproliferation policies.
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2024 ANS Winter Conference and Expo
November 17–21, 2024
Orlando, FL|Renaissance Orlando at SeaWorld
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The Standards Committee is responsible for the development and maintenance of voluntary consensus standards that address the design, analysis, and operation of components, systems, and facilities related to the application of nuclear science and technology. Find out What’s New, check out the Standards Store, or Get Involved today!
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Latest News
Tank waste operations resume at Idaho’s IWTU
The Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management announced yesterday that waste processing operations have resumed at the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU) at the Idaho National Laboratory Site. The resumption of operations follows the completion of two maintenance campaigns at the radioactive liquid waste treatment facility.
Robert L. Hirsch, Gerald L. Kulcinski, Doug Chapin, Herman Diekamp
Fusion Science and Technology | Volume 76 | Number 5 | July 2020 | Pages 670-679
doi.org/10.1080/15361055.2020.1766272
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
The Electric Power Research Institute outlined three criteria important for a commercially viable fusion power plant: competitive electric power cost, regulatory simplicity, and public acceptance. In this paper we consider likely U.S. regulatory considerations for deuterium-tritium (D-T) fusion power reactors, relying on existing criteria and past actions by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which has asserted regulatory jurisdiction over U.S. commercial fusion reactors. We begin with consideration of a basic D-T fusion reactor, independent of plasma confinement approach. Because tritium and radioactivity are present, likely regulation will require containment structures and various safety measures for each component. Regulators are certain to require that all nuclear components of the system be housed in an overall containment vessel that must be held at less than atmospheric pressure to contain any leakage of tritium, radioactive corrosion products, radioactive coolant, and activated elements in the air. In addition, regulators are sure to require plant structure and operations that minimize the potential for clandestine plutonium breeding. Next, we add superconducting magnets and a plasma dump (divertor) to the basic system and recognize the small but nonzero probability of those magnets explosively quenching, potentially causing reactor damage and dramatically increasing containment vessel pressure. Finally, we consider ITER as prototypical of a D-T–fueled fusion power reactor. Because ITER-like systems are subject to damaging plasma disruptions, regulators are almost certain to require safeguards against such events significantly damaging first walls and subsystems. Finally, we believe that regulators are not likely to back off significantly in requirements related to the deuterium-deuterium and D3He fuel cycles even though the tritium production and the neutron damage in the latter fuel cycle are significantly below those in a D-T system. However, regulations for p11B and 3He3He fuel cycles are certain to be dramatically less demanding because of the lack of tritium and essentially no neutron production.