ANS is committed to advancing, fostering, and promoting the development and application of nuclear sciences and technologies to benefit society.
Explore the many uses for nuclear science and its impact on energy, the environment, healthcare, food, and more.
Explore membership for yourself or for your organization.
Conference Spotlight
2026 Nuclear Energy Conference & Expo (NECX)
August 24–27, 2026
Dallas, TX|Hilton Anatole
Latest Magazine Issues
Jul 2026
Jan 2026
2026
Latest Journal Issues
Nuclear Science and Engineering
September 2026
Nuclear Technology
August 2026
Fusion Science and Technology
Latest News
The human factor in licensing and operating the next generation of nuclear plants
As human factors specialists working at the intersection of human performance and nuclear operations, we are witnessing one of the nuclear sector’s most significant transitions in decades. The emergence of small modular reactors, microreactors, and other advanced designs is reshaping the industry’s landscape. Digital instrumentation and controls, passive safety systems, and increased automation are creating opportunities for greater safety margins and more flexible operation. These same features also fundamentally redefine what it means to “operate” a nuclear plant. Interactions among human roles, automation, and passive systems shape how people maintain awareness, exercise judgment, and intervene when necessary. These developments affect both operational realities and the regulatory foundations on which nuclear safety is built.
Timo A. Vanttola, Markku K. Rajamäki
Nuclear Technology | Volume 85 | Number 1 | April 1989 | Pages 33-74
Technical Paper | Nuclear Safety | doi.org/10.13182/NT89-A34225
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
Some of the most frequently presented scenarios for the initial power excursion of the Chernobyl accident are evaluated based on computer simulations. The applied transient model uses one-dimensional descriptions of the reactor core and the main flow circuit. According to the simulations, a slow flow decrease caused by gradual slowing down of the four main circulation pumps could have initiated the accident only if the void reactivity coefficient had been considerably larger than the original Soviet figure. On the other hand, a faster flow reduction, such as pump cavitation or deliberate stopping of even some of the pumps, would have produced enough void for prompt criticality. However, this scenario is sensitive to the size of the void coefficient and to the amount of flow reduction. The most probable initiator was considered to be the positive scram caused by the graphite followers of the manual control rods. Such a mechanism would naturally have brought the additional reactivity to the bottom half of the reactor, and the timing of the power surge would have been the reported one. The simulations indicated that the positive scram was possible only because of the double-humped axial power profile that probably prevailed in the reactor before the accident. The simulations also demonstrated the inability of the shutdown system in this sequence.