ANS is committed to advancing, fostering, and promoting the development and application of nuclear sciences and technologies to benefit society.
Explore the many uses for nuclear science and its impact on energy, the environment, healthcare, food, and more.
Explore membership for yourself or for your organization.
Conference Spotlight
2026 Nuclear Energy Conference & Expo (NECX)
August 24–27, 2026
Dallas, TX|Hilton Anatole
Latest Magazine Issues
Jul 2026
Jan 2026
2026
Latest Journal Issues
Nuclear Science and Engineering
September 2026
Nuclear Technology
August 2026
Fusion Science and Technology
Latest News
The human factor in licensing and operating the next generation of nuclear plants
As human factors specialists working at the intersection of human performance and nuclear operations, we are witnessing one of the nuclear sector’s most significant transitions in decades. The emergence of small modular reactors, microreactors, and other advanced designs is reshaping the industry’s landscape. Digital instrumentation and controls, passive safety systems, and increased automation are creating opportunities for greater safety margins and more flexible operation. These same features also fundamentally redefine what it means to “operate” a nuclear plant. Interactions among human roles, automation, and passive systems shape how people maintain awareness, exercise judgment, and intervene when necessary. These developments affect both operational realities and the regulatory foundations on which nuclear safety is built.
Merril Eisenbud
Nuclear Technology | Volume 87 | Number 2 | October 1989 | Pages 514-519
Technical Paper | TMI-2: Health Physics and Environmental Release / Radiation Biology and Environment | doi.org/10.13182/NT89-A27746
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
Destruction of the core of Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) resulted in the release of large quantities of primary coolant into the reactor, auxiliary, and fuel handling buildings. Volatile fission products, mainly noble gases, with lesser amounts of radioiodines, escaped into the plant atmosphere and were discharged to the environment via the stack from the plant ventilation system. The contaminated water was retained within the buildings, from which no uncontrolled releases occurred. Radiation monitoring personnel from several government agencies and national laboratories were quickly assembled at TMI-2. The data they collected were analyzed by specialists from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the national laboratories operated by the U.S. Department of Energy; the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; and the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. These efforts made it possible to develop estimates of the dose received by the maximally exposed individual and the collective dose received by the more than two million people who lived within 80.5 km from the plant. The collective dose estimates ranged from 28 to 35 person-Sv (2800 to 3500 person-rem). The maximum dose to any individual was estimated to be <1 mSv (100 mrem). Essentially all of the off-site collective dose was due to the release of ∼370 PBq (10 million Ci) of noble gases. In addition, <1.1 TBq (30 Ci) of 131I and 0.148 TBq (4 Ci) of 133I are estimated to have been released to the atmosphere, with small amounts of other radionuclides released to the Susquehanna River. When accepted risk coefficients are applied to the estimates of collective dose, it is concluded that no radiation-induced cancers would be expected to occur in the lifetime of the exposed population.