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August 24–27, 2026
Dallas, TX|Hilton Anatole
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The human factor in licensing and operating the next generation of nuclear plants
As human factors specialists working at the intersection of human performance and nuclear operations, we are witnessing one of the nuclear sector’s most significant transitions in decades. The emergence of small modular reactors, microreactors, and other advanced designs is reshaping the industry’s landscape. Digital instrumentation and controls, passive safety systems, and increased automation are creating opportunities for greater safety margins and more flexible operation. These same features also fundamentally redefine what it means to “operate” a nuclear plant. Interactions among human roles, automation, and passive systems shape how people maintain awareness, exercise judgment, and intervene when necessary. These developments affect both operational realities and the regulatory foundations on which nuclear safety is built.
Michael Epstein, Hans K. Fauske
Nuclear Technology | Volume 87 | Number 4 | December 1989 | Pages 1021-1035
Late Paper | TMI-2: Decontamination and Waste Management / Nuclear Safety | doi.org/10.13182/NT89-A27694
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
It is postulated that the collapse of the upper debris bed was the main cause of core failure and core material relocation to the lower vessel plenum during the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident. It is shown that this mechanism of core relocation can account for the time scale(s) and energy transfer rate inferred from plant instrumentation. Additional analysis suggests that the water in the lower half of the reactor vessel was subcooled at the onset of relocation. Moreover, subcooling serves to explain the final coolable configuration at the bottom of the TMI-2 vessel. An important aspect of the analysis of the relocation event is that significant quantities of corium melt were not mixed with water at any one time, indicating an even lower likelihood of steam-explosion-induced vessel and containment failure than heretofore believed.