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North American construction is back—smaller and faster—at OPG’s Darlington
“The nuclear renaissance is real here,” said Ontario Power Generation’s Subo Sinnathamby on May 8, one year to the day after OPG secured a final investment decision to build the first of four planned BWRX-300 reactors at its Darlington nuclear power plant, and shortly after the new reactor’s foundation was lifted into place. “We got our license to construct in April and our [final investment decision] in May, and we’ve been off to the races since.”
Sang Min Han, Poong Hyun Seong (KAIST)
Proceedings | Nuclear Plant Instrumentation, Control, and Human-Machine Interface Technolgies (NPIC&HMIT 2019) | Orlando, FL, February 9-14, 2019 | Pages 1088-1094
The aim of this study is to propose initiating threats and their bounding groups in order to identify initiating cyber threats, and to further apply the initiating threats to cyber risk assessment in nuclear power plants (NPPs). NPP are generally thought to be secure from cyber-attacks, as the control/monitoring network and business network in a NPP are separate from the external network. However, consecutive incidents at nuclear facilities have revealed the necessity of cyber risk assessment for NPPs. To determine initiating threats and their bounding groups for NPP, Operational experience report (OER) and repository of industrial security incidents (RISI) database were utilized. Each of the chosen incidents was documented with descriptions based on the following five characteristics: 1) type of attacker, 2) intentionality, 3) access method, 4) access type, and 5) purpose of the attack. The proposed organization of initiating threats and their bounding groups for NPPs represent a valid first attempt to determine such threats based on actual industrial incidents. This advance can also be further applied to describe scenarios and models of NPP cyber-risk assessments.