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Division Spotlight
Young Members Group
The Young Members Group works to encourage and enable all young professional members to be actively involved in the efforts and endeavors of the Society at all levels (Professional Divisions, ANS Governance, Local Sections, etc.) as they transition from the role of a student to the role of a professional. It sponsors non-technical workshops and meetings that provide professional development and networking opportunities for young professionals, collaborates with other Divisions and Groups in developing technical and non-technical content for topical and national meetings, encourages its members to participate in the activities of the Groups and Divisions that are closely related to their professional interests as well as in their local sections, introduces young members to the rules and governance structure of the Society, and nominates young professionals for awards and leadership opportunities available to members.
Meeting Spotlight
2024 ANS Annual Conference
June 16–19, 2024
Las Vegas, NV|Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino
Standards Program
The Standards Committee is responsible for the development and maintenance of voluntary consensus standards that address the design, analysis, and operation of components, systems, and facilities related to the application of nuclear science and technology. Find out What’s New, check out the Standards Store, or Get Involved today!
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May 2024
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Nuclear Science and Engineering
June 2024
Nuclear Technology
Fusion Science and Technology
Latest News
U.S. nuclear capacity factors: Ideal for data centers?
Baseload nuclear generation doesn’t get the respect it deserves, if you ask nuclear operators. But the hyperscale data centers that process our digital lives—like the one right next to the Susquehanna plant in northeastern Pennsylvania—are pushing electricity demand up. Clean, reliable capacity now looks a lot more valuable.
Milos I. Atz, Massimiliano Fratoni
Nuclear Technology | Volume 210 | Number 5 | May 2024 | Pages 795-813
Research Article | doi.org/10.1080/00295450.2023.2246736
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
Nuclear fuel cycle advancements will result in new types of fissile material, including nuclear wastes, that require security and safeguards. Nuclear wastes may be more vulnerable for diversion by non-state actors, and chemical processing to recover fissile material is not an insurmountable challenge. Previous work has applied a figure of merit (FOM) to assess material attractiveness and security risks. This analysis applies the material attractiveness FOM to wastes produced by fuel cycles from the Fuel Cycle Evaluation and Screening (FCES) study. Two aspects of security risk are studied: (1) the time before the fissile material in the waste becomes attractive and (2) the number of waste packages required to obtain a critical mass of fissile material. Two fuel cycles are presented to highlight detailed results: (1) once-through use of low-enriched U in light water reactors (LWRs) and (2) continuous recycle of Pu in sodium fast reactors (SFRs). Increasing LWR used nuclear fuel (UNF) package loading increases the time to attractiveness, but the larger packages contain enough Pu for multiple critical masses. The high-level waste (HLW) from processing the SFR fuels has similar FOM behavior but longer time to attractiveness due to the concentration of fission products. More HLW packages are required to obtain a critical mass; that number can be further increased by increasing the separation efficiency. Extended to all FCES fuel cycles, the minimum time before attractiveness is generally lower for UNF than for HLW because radioactivity is concentrated in HLW. For nearly all fuel cycles that produce UNF, only one package is required to recover enough fissile material for a critical mass. Notably, some advanced fuel cycles produce HLW, of which only two packages need to be recovered to obtain a critical mass, even when the target fissile material is recycled. Going forward, an assessment of the security risks posed by fissile material in nuclear wastes will need to quantify the challenge posed by separations. Ultimately, the assessment could inform security and response measures; whether any of the observations might affect these measures could be an area for future work. Finally, future analysis could study whether different fuel cycle wastes are more attractive for use in radiological dispersal devices or radiological exposure devices.