As one of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, long-term station blackout (SBO) and subsequent loss of ultimate heat sinks have prompted discussion on this topic in the nuclear industry. The SBO sequences for a Westinghouse three-loop pressurized water reactor (PWR) have been under investigation for a long period. To cope with the long-term SBO issue, many nuclear power plants have decided to replace the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal by the new passive thermal shutdown seal (PSDS). The PSDS is a fail-safe protection device that will significantly reduce leakage from the RCP seal in case of loss of cooling. This makes a seal loss-of-coolant accident no longer a risk-significant event, and the relevant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models need to be modified to reflect the associated plant change. The PRA model of a Westinghouse PWR plant has been reviewed to reflect this more strongly; i.e. loss of component cooling water (CCW), loss of 4-kV vital alternating-current power, and loss of off-site power are revised for their sequences. According to the Westinghouse analysis, the PSDS temperature must be maintained below 104°C, and the operators have to control the RCP speed. In this paper, those factors are incorporated into the event tree structure revision of the loss of CCW event (TC) and loss of power either off-site (TP) or vital power A train (TAPB). In another case, LOOP initiating events need to consider the time span that the blackout conditions would affect the RCP seal integrity. Because the RCP will be tripped automatically, the limitation associated with RCP speed will not be applicable. Compared with the TC, TP, and TAPB event tree base cases, RCP speed slowdown or available time span is introduced into the PSDS model. The relevant part in the PRA model is subject to review and modification. The risk reduction associated with the PSDS is found to be significant.