NN Asks: Why are states racing to get back into nuclear?

The first is technological. Since the Manhattan Project, the United States has operated more than 100 commercial nuclear reactors and has built an unmatched fuel cycle and regulatory base. Thousands of reactor-years of safe operation have transformed nuclear from a frontier technology into an industrial backbone. That maturity now supports new generations of small modular and microreactors, along with advanced fuels and digital control systems around which states can plan rather than speculate.

The second timeline is institutional and political. Bipartisan support for research and workforce capacity has remained remarkably steady since the early 2000s. The Nuclear Energy Research Initiative, the Integrated University Program, and the Energy Policy Act of 2004 expanded university infrastructure and training. The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future renewed focus on waste management and consent-based siting. Subsequent executive orders—particularly those of the Trump administration—modernized licensing and recognized nuclear within clean energy credit structures. Across administrations, the message has been consistent: invest in R&D, strengthen universities, and preserve U.S. leadership.

The third is economic reality. Electrification, data centers, and shoring up of manufacturing are pushing energy planners back to fundamentals: firm, zero-carbon baseload. Renewables have earned their place, but grid operators from ISO-New England to ERCOT warn that variability alone cannot sustain reliability under stress. Nuclear’s dispatchable, compact power complements renewables and stabilizes prices—especially as extreme weather becomes the norm.

And that brings us to the fourth timeline—the macroeconomic. States increasingly recognize that stable, affordable, clean energy is not just an environmental goal but an economic strategy. Nuclear’s long life and domestic supply chain anchor predictable energy costs and high-wage jobs. Clean energy credit programs are evolving accordingly—from narrow renewable credits to broader zero-emission frameworks that explicitly include nuclear. The outcome is a rare consensus: nuclear energy drives decarbonization and durable economic growth.

Together, these timelines explain why states’ nuclear policies are not mood swings but instead are outcomes of 20 years of technical maturity, bipartisan investment, and market necessity.

What’s striking are the differences in how states are moving. Virginia, Texas, and Tennessee illustrate long-term commitment. Each has paired state funding with university-driven R&D and, in Tennessee’s case, deep partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Virginia’s Energy Workforce Consortium, which links its universities and utilities, is turning its attention to the state’s rapidly expanding data center corridor—striving for a scalable nuclear energy solution to meet the increasing demand on the grid. Texas has moved fast to create a state nuclear office, align SMR siting studies with industrial corridors, and advance the growth of a large-scale nuclear supply chain.

Other states are newer entrants—“sprinters” driven by manufacturing goals or clean energy mandates. They lack the deep institutional networks of Tennessee or Virginia but are compensating with urgency.

Still others, like Massachusetts, are “setting the table”: updating statutes, coordinating community colleges, and rediscovering the strength of their university reactors. In one very concrete move, Gov. Healey announced that the commonwealth would partner with UMass Lowell to develop “Advanced Nuclear and Fusion Energy Roadmaps” to accelerate Massachusetts’s leadership in emerging nuclear technologies—positioning itself for what comes next.

Across this spectrum, motivations are converging. States want to stabilize bills, meet corporate clean power demand, capture federal funding, and build a durable workforce. The fastest movers share three habits: they name an accountable office, stand up a test bed early in the process, and invest in the training pipeline before construction begins.

If the last decade was about rediscovering nuclear, the next two must be about operationalizing it. A practical near-term agenda starts with three actions. First, create a nuclear acceleration unit—a small, empowered task force with a 24-month mandate to deliver a siting short list, upgrade university test beds, and coordinate a joint workforce plan with community colleges and trade unions.

Second, modernize legacy statutes from the 1970s and ’80s that predate current safety cases and designs and repeal blanket moratoria that no longer reflect technical reality.

Third, reimagine how students gain real-world experience. For two decades, Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission programs have built a robust university–national lab pipeline. The next phase should extend that model toward industry—start-ups, utilities, constructors, and energy planners—where deployment actually happens. The experiential path of the 2030s should be a continuum: research on campus; testing and safety culture at the national labs; and applied work in design, licensing, and construction with industry partners. States can accelerate this by funding rotational fellowships and matching grants that place students across this full ecosystem. It’s how we turn learning into doing.

Beyond workforce and policy, states should pair nuclear with place-based growth. Early deployments belong where they create the most value: ports, federal sites, and coal-to-clean conversions that reuse existing grid connections and skilled labor. Some are even reserving small tranches of capacity for industrial hosts and data-center parks—an efficient way to match clean megawatts with high-value loads.

The point isn’t to pick winners—it’s to shorten the distance between interest and electrons. States that harness their universities and, where possible, nearby DOE labs will move fastest from pilots to playbooks to projects in service. The public is ready for a frank, practical conversation. Our institutions are ready to deliver. What’s needed now is the political will to connect the dots—and keep the lights on, cleanly, for everyone.

Sukesh Aghara (Sukesh_Aghara@uml.edu) is a professor of nuclear engineering and associate dean for research at the Francis College of Engineering at the University of Massachusetts–Lowell.

Editor’s note: This article is an extended version of the NN Asks column that appears in the January 2026 issue of Nuclear News.