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
design basis for protection of light water nuclear power plants against the effects of postulated pipe rupture

an American National Standard

WITHDRAWN

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ANSI/ANS-58.2-1988 (W1998), Design Basis for Protection of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants Against the Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture

An error has been identified in Equation D-10 on page 69 of this standard. The last term in equation D-10 is inverted. It should be P_{jc}/P_{oe} as shown below:

(2) In Region 2, for $L_c < L < L_a$, the jet pressure is given by:

$$\frac{P_j}{P_{jc}} = \left(1 - \frac{2r}{D_j}\right) \left\{ 1 - 2\left(\frac{2r}{D_j}\right) \left[1 - 3C_{Te} \left(\frac{D_e}{D_j}\right)^2 \left(\frac{P_{jc}}{P_{oe}}\right) \right] \right\} \quad (\text{Eq. D-10})$$

For future clarification, contact the ANS Standards Administrator at standards@ans.org.

November 2014

ANSI/ANS-58.2-1988
Revision of
ANSI/ANS-58.2-1980

American National Standard
Design Basis for Protection of Light Water Nuclear Power
Plants Against the Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture

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American Nuclear Society

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Foreword

(This Foreword is not a part of American National Standard Design Basis for Protection of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants Against the Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture, ANSI/ANS-58.2-1988.)

The piping in nuclear power plants is designed, fabricated and tested to the stringent requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the ASME Code for Power Piping. As a result, the experience with nuclear plant piping is very favorable. Nevertheless, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires that nuclear plant safety be based on a defense-in-depth philosophy, and that protection against postulated piping accidents be provided by designing the containment system, emergency core cooling systems, and other protective features against the effects of these postulated accidents. This standard provides guidelines in order to achieve a consistent approach to providing plant protection except that the design of the containment system and emergency core cooling systems is not addressed.

Working Group ANS-58.2 of the standards committee of the American Nuclear Society, was reactivated in February 1984 to incorporate the LBB approach (Section 12) and to review and update the portions of the standard addressing postulated rupture locations and configurations (Section 4) and jet impingement effects (Section 7). In addition, substantial modifications were made to the portions of the standard addressing compartment pressurization effects (Section 8) and flooding effects (Section 10) to reflect developments in American National Standard Subcompartment Pressure and Temperature Transient Analysis in Light Water Reactors, ANSI/ANS-56.10-1987 and American National Standard Design Criteria for Protection Against the Effects of Compartment Flooding in Light Water Reactor Plants, ANSI/ANS-56.11-1988, respectively, since the issuance of ANSI/ANS-58.2-1980. Finally, the entire standard was reviewed and changes made where appropriate for consistency with Sections 4, 7, 8, 10 and 12.

Since the issuance of ANSI/ANS-58.2-1980, the leak-before-break (LBB) approach has been accepted as an alternative to the practice of providing protection against postulated pipe ruptures of arbitrary size. The LBB approach is a mechanistic fracture mechanics method of determining pipe rupture behavior that may be used to either eliminate or reduce the effects that need to be considered at a postulated rupture location.* Currently regulatory authorities have limited the application of the LBB approach to only excluding consideration of dynamic effects associated with pipe ruptures (e.g., pipe whip, missile generation, jet impingement loads, etc.). Recognizing that the technical basis for the LBB approach is sound and its application will probably be extended sometime in the future, this standard presents a consistent technical application of the approach. Where this standard may not agree with current regulatory practice, it is so indicated.

There are four areas where the position provided in this standard is less restrictive than the corresponding current NRC position. First, the NRC requires application of the LBB approach to all points in a given run of pipe including the end points at each anchor. This standard allows application of the LBB approach to any point in a given run of pipe where the rupture locations have been postulated in accordance with the rupture locations criteria of Section 4. Second, at locations where leakage cracks based on the LBB approach have been postulated instead of full-sized circumferential or longitudinal breaks or instead of arbitrarily sized through wall cracks, the NRC currently requires that the evaluation of environmental and flooding effects be based on the

*Information regarding the development of the LBB approach is provided in NUREG-1061, "Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping Review Committee, Volumes 3 and 5, *Evaluation of Potential for Pipe Breaks, and Summary.*"

flow rate from the circumferential break, longitudinal break or through-wall crack being replaced, instead of the flow rate from the leakage crack. Third, the NRC position on the fatigue usage factor basis for postulating break locations is more conservative than this standard (0.1 compared to 0.4). Although the 0.1 fatigue usage factor is considered to be conservative, recent studies have led to a concern relating to the degree of conservatism in the design fatigue curves in the ASME Code that provides the basis of this fatigue usage factor. These curves were developed based on highly polished specimen fatigue tests in air and are shown to be less conservative than when Code allowable fabrication flaws and high temperature water environment are taken into consideration. For the present, the NRC has chosen to retain the fatigue usage factor of 0.1 to bound these concerns. The fourth area pertains to the criteria for postulating intermediate breaks in Class 1 piping not in the containment penetration area. This standard utilizes a higher stress threshold than does the NRC.

Consistent with past practice, this standard does not address event combinations. Specifically, this standard does not provide guidance on the combination of pipe rupture with other events such as water hammer, seismic activity, airplane crashes or acts of sabotage.

Working group ANS-58.2 of the Standards Committee of the American Nuclear Society, had the following membership at the time it developed this standard:

J. N. Fox, Chairman, *General Electric Company*
S. Hou, *U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*
D. A. Peck, *Combustion Engineering, Inc.*
E. R. Johnson, *Westinghouse Electric Corporation*

W. D. Maxham, *Babcock & Wilcox Company*
J. H. Gray, *Sargent and Lundy*
A. Singh, *Electric Power Research Institute*

The members of working group ANS-58.2 wish to express their appreciation to J. M. Healzer from S. Levy, Incorporated for his valuable contribution in reviewing and updating the jet geometry models and evaluation methods described in Appendices C and D, respectively.

The American Nuclear Society's Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee (NUPPSCO) had the following membership at the time of its approval of this standard.

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