## **American National Standard**

March 31, 1989 ANSI/ANS-58.3-1977

physical protection for systems and components important to safety

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**American National Standard Physical Protection for Systems** and Components Important to Safety

Secretariat **American Nuclear Society** 

Prepared by the **American Nuclear Society Standards Committee** Working Group ANS-58.3

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**Abstract** This Standard presents information to a designer on how to physically protect systems and components in a nuclear power plant against hazards. Systems requiring protection and characteristics of hazards are described. Criteria are given to indicate when protection is not required. A probability of 10<sup>-7</sup> per site per year is used as the upper probability guideline limit for Condition of Design IV events. Physical protection methods for each hazard are discussed.

## American National Standard

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## **Foreword** (This Foreword is not part of American National Standard Physical Protection for Systems and Components Important to Safety, ANSI/ANS-58.3-1977)

In March, 1973 Working Group ANS-31.1 was initiated to write a standard on "Physical Separation Requirements for Safety Systems (other than Electrical)."

The charter of ANS-31.1 was to identify systems and components which could be exposed to internal or external plant missiles, fire, explosion, electrical interaction, or other occurrences which might require spatial separation or special protection in the form of barrier walls or isolation in individual enclosures to prevent common-mode failure or damage. The scope also included providing guides to the type of protection required and considering the likelihood of failure if unprotected. This charter has been generally followed.

The Working Group met on five occasions and in March, 1974 a draft was sent to ANS for review comment by an industry review group. A revised draft which took into consideration the industry comments was written by the Working Group in August, 1974. In September, 1974 this draft was balloted by the Working Group and along with some editorial changes was given unanimous approval to forward to Subcommittee ANS-50.

A November, 1974 draft entitled: "Separation Requirements for Protection of Systems and Components Important to Safety" was presented to Subcommittee ANS-50 in January, 1975. The comments of the ANS-50 members fell into three main categories:

(1) Some members felt the original scope called for specific guidance, and it was suggested that the Working Group investigate a change in scope, and whether other standards were necessary to provide specific guidance

(2) Some members felt the draft should state specific probability acceptance limits

(3) Some members thought the word "separation" was confusing as defined in the draft.

In March, 1975, the Working Group met to revise the draft to reflect the comments of Subcommittee ANS-50. The Working Group addressed these comments as follows:

(1) ANS-58.3 believes that this Standard should give general protection criteria and general guidance on how to implement protection methods. Specific minimum distances between hazards and components, thickness of barriers, layout of enclosures, specific design requirements for protection methods, etc., are left to the designer and ANS-58.3 believes it should not attempt in this Standard to quantify these for all the combinations of hazards and components needing protection in a nuclear power generating station. Although the March, 1975 draft was revised to provide more guidance to the designer, detailed guidance on designing for protection is more appropriately covered by other standards. Existing standards which by scope provide the desired guidance are referred to herein. Where no standard exists, ANS-58.3 has prepared and submitted scopes for recommended standards to Subcommittee ANS-50 members. For hazards not covered in other standards, the treatment in this Standard attempts to provide information useful to the designer.

(2) The March, 1975 draft was revised to provide a probability acceptance limit as it has been formulated and exists in draft form.<sup>1</sup> The basic parameter accepted from this source was the Upper Probability Limit for Damage with a threshold value for design conditions exceeding Condition IV. The other acceptance limits for lower conditions of design are under review by an industry group, but methodology and details had not been determined at the time of promulgation of this Standard.

(3) The March, 1975 draft was re-titled, "Protection Criteria for Systems and Components Important to Safety." The word "separation," which was previously used to mean protection by means of distance, barriers, enclosures, or restraints, has been changed to "protection."

A revision incorporating these comments was sent to ANS-50 in July, 1975. In September, 1975 Subcommittee ANS-50 ballotted on the July, 1975 draft and agreed with the approach taken in this Standard which provides general guidance to a designer

<sup>&#</sup>x27;See Appendix B, Reference 1.

rather than providing specific protection criteria. The criteria in this Standard which denote requirements are given in: Section 4, Protection Criteria; and 6.6.1, Criteria for When Protection is Not Required. The other major portion of the standard provides information which is believed to be useful to a designer faced with providing protection of equipment against hazards.

The Working Group feels that the hazards interaction between mechanical (including instrumentation and control components) and electrical components should be identified in one document. This interface has been stated in this Standard.

In February, 1974 the former ANS-20 and ANS-30 Subcommittees merged to form the newly constituted ANS-50 Subcommittee. The numerical designation of Working Group ANS-31.1 was changed to ANS-55.3. In January, 1975, Subcommittee ANS-50 was reorganized and the numerical designation of Working Group ANS-55.3 was changed to Working Group ANS-58.3.

Working Group ANS-58.3 of the American Nuclear Society Standards Committee Consists of the following members:

- S. J. Milioti, Chairman, American Electric Power Service Corporation
- D. Fischer, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- R. M. Hunt, General Atomic Company
- S. W. Kaut, NUTECH
- E. J. Lozito, Virginia Electric & Power Company
- J. C. Mesmeringer, Westinghouse Electric Corporation

J. W. Minarick, Babcock and Wilcox Company

- B. D. Redd, United Engineers and Constructors, Inc.
- J. W. Stacey, Yankee Atomic Electric Company
- R. M. Waters, Combustion Engineering Incorporated
- E. Wester, General Electric Company

Contributions were also made by:

- D. A. Coudriet, Bechtel Power Corporation
- R. J. Brockman, Babcock and Wilcox Company
- T. G. Dunning, General Atomic Company

Working Group ANS-58.3 wishes to acknowledge Working Group ANS-2.12 for permission to abstract, as Appendix A, portions of their material on probability in proposed American National Standard N635 "Guidelines for Combining Natural and External Manmade Hazards at Power Reactor Sites."<sup>2</sup>

Protection against sabotage is not addressed in this Standard. When the American National Standards Committee N18 ballotted on this Standard in May, 1976, the major comment was that the  $10^{-7}$  probability acceptance limit should be noted as a guideline. This has been done.

The membership of Subcommittee ANS-50 at the time of their approval of this Standard was:

- James F. Mallay, Chairman, Babcock & Wilcox M. Kehnemuy Company mission
- R. F. Ash, Baltimore Gas & Electric Company Donald A. Campbell, Westinghouse Electric Corporation
- C. O. Coffer, Kaiser Engineers
- W. H. D'Ardenne, General Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Division
- F. A. Dougherty, EDS Nuclear
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- D. R. Patterson, Tennessee Valley Authority
- R. E. Schreiber, Westinghouse Electric Corporation
- J. W. Stacey, Yankee Atomic Electric Company
- G. C. Vellender, Fluor-Pioneer
- G. P. Wagner, Commonwealth Edison Company
- Marilyn D. Weber, American Nuclear Society
- G. L. Wessman, General Atomic Company
- J. E. Windhorst, Southern Company Services
- Frank Zapp, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
- C. B. Zitek, Commonwealth Edison Company

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See Appendix B, Reference 6.

The American National Standards Committee N18, Nuclear Design Criteria, which reviewed and approved this Standard in 1976, had the following membership:

L. J. Koch, Chairman C. B. Zitek, Secretary

Organization Represented

Name of Representatives

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