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ogy represented by small modular reactors. While Fluor's NuScale 60-MWe [gross] SMR is the most prominent example, as it is currently undergoing design certification review by the NRC, other SMR designs are being considered.

I understand that Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems—a public power agency providing wholesale electricity to over 40 community-owned electric utilities in the West—has selected the Idaho National Laboratory as the site for the first NuScale plant. UAMPS is in the process of obtaining power purchase agreements from its members.

In the context of this or perhaps other projects in the United States, one could imagine significant benefits for SMR success by the federal government's ordering a book of 10 SMRs or, at a minimum, guaranteeing power purchase agreements for the output of 10 SMRs once in operation. The NELA legislation introduced last month allows for long-term government power purchase agreements for power produced by nuclear reactors. That would be a significant constructive step.

Why would this government investment in SMRs matter? Here are a few potential responses:

- It would provide a known source of guaranteed financing.
- A guaranteed build of let's say 10 units would incentivize investment in manufacturing capability so as to hopefully achieve economies of scale.
- It would reduce the risk of the nth unit, as the project would apply lessons learned from construction of the first unit to the second, and so forth.
- It would be accompanied by an NRC design certification, which in spite of the decline of the U.S. commercial industry is still considered the gold standard. Many countries do not have robust electrical grids (Vietnam is just one example) and thus do not need to add electrical generating capacity in 1,000-MW increments. The smaller increments afforded by SMRs might be the optimum fit for some countries' needs.

The third initiative requires us to take a realistic view of the world toward civil nuclear cooperation agreements, otherwise known as 123 agreements, based on the Atomic Energy Act. In April of this year, I joined a number of other former and current government and military officials in signing a letter to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the U.S.–Saudi Arabia civil nuclear cooperation agreement (or, more simply, the Saudi 123 agreement). The signers of the letter state their strong support for nonproliferation efforts but urge the conclusion of an agreement with Saudi Arabia that meets, *but does not exceed,* the requirements of U.S. law. The letter pragmatically urges that the United States not go beyond existing requirements to legally bind the Saudis to an agreement that forbids the acquisition of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities as some in Congress insist. The reasoning is quite simple: The Saudis are not likely to accept these extra measures (they are not required by the Atomic Energy Act) and will go to other countries—namely Russia, China, or the Republic of Korea—for nuclear technology. For context, it is important to note that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran allows existing and future uranium enrichment activities in that country.

The continued absence of U.S. commercial entities from the worldwide nuclear market further lessens our influence internationally on nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation. We must be pragmatic.

In nautical terms, our commercial nuclear industry is nearing extremis. As noted in the Center for Strategic and International Studies' July 2018 report, *Back from the Brink: A Threatened Nuclear Energy Industry Compromises National Security,* the time for action is now. NN